Anatomy of a Safety Stand Down

In March of 2016, the United States Government Accountability Office (an independent agency that works for Congress) produced a report stating that stronger oversight mechanisms are needed to improve safety in high-containment laboratories. The laboratories referred to are those which work with hazardous biological agents in order to protect public and animal health and the food supply against contamination of those agents. Because of several very public lab safety lapses in the past two years, the report makes 33 recommendations to improve lab safety. These recommendations include the development and update of policies that contain missing safety elements, the reporting of oversight activity to senior officials, and the development of plans with time frames to implement the safety recommendations. The report basically recommends a “Safety Stand Down.” Has your laboratory seen a similar situation? Have you encountered a series of like safety events that created the need to stop and review?

OSHA’s definition of a safety stand down is “an event for employers to talk directly to employees about safety.” Because of the danger to employees, a more specific definition means that all work stops until the issue is corrected and all affected (or potentially affected) staff has been educated to make sure the issue does not re-occur. However, in the real world, unless someone is in imminent danger, the work of the laboratory must go on for the sake of patient care. Still, a stand down can be important, and there are ways to run one successfully.

Once you have decided there is a need for the stand-down, develop the stand-down education. This can include a set of presentation slides, a hand-out, or talking points to use as the information is delivered. Make sure you stick to the topic(s) at hand, and do not include extraneous information, but be certain to include all items that are pertinent to the stand-down subject.

The next step is deciding on the stand-down delivery approach. Will you meet with staff one-on one, in small groups, or with everyone at the same time? Choose the meeting location(s) and schedule the meetings. Because this is a stand-down and a safety issue that must be dealt with, these steps should occur quickly. If you are facilitating the stand-down but not delivering it personally, be sure to give a short deadline for its completion and mandate that all involved personnel are included. Keep documentation of attendance and subject matter for future reference.

Once the stand-down is completed, gather the documentation of attendance and any other associated information and keep it for your records. This does not end the stand-down, however. Make a plan and a schedule to follow-up on the safety issue. The plan may include daily or weekly checks to ensure new processes are being followed or that staff has understood the information completely.

Conducting a laboratory safety stand-down can seem difficult and time-consuming. It may interrupt the work you planned to do, and it may change your schedule for the next couple of days or weeks. While that may be inconvenient, remember that this course of action was chosen to help prevent harm to employees or patients, and that is what laboratory professionals are here to do.

During the week of May 2, 2016, OSHA called for a construction fall prevention safety stand-down. This was in response to a high number of preventable worker deaths due to falls on the job. What safety issues have you seen in your lab? Have you seen multiple needle sticks? What about slips, trips, and falls? If you notice a group of similar safety events, it may be time to conduct a safety stand-down. If you deliver the information, provide the education, and document the attendance of all affected staff, you will prevent further injury and continue to raise awareness in the lab of vital safety issues.

 

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-Dan Scungio, MT(ASCP), SLS, CQA (ASQ) has over 25 years experience as a certified medical technologist. Today he is the Laboratory Safety Officer for Sentara Healthcare, a system of seven hospitals and over 20 laboratories and draw sites in the Tidewater area of Virginia. He is also known as Dan the Lab Safety Man, a lab safety consultant, educator, and trainer.

“Flustration”

Contrary to popular belief, “irregardless” is not a word. The correct word is “regardless.” One can be frustrated or one can be flustered, but it is incorrect to say one is “flustrated.”When these common grammatical errors are made, it can be very irksome for some Type A Personality laboratory professionals. For those in the field of lab safety, however, this can be a lesson for learning how to improve the lab safety culture.

Very often grammatical errors are made because people simply do not remember what is correct, or the correct use of the word was never explained to them. If we hear something that is wrong, we may make a judgement about the person who said it—they are not well-educated, they are lazy, etc. We tell ourselves a story, and often, unfortunately, it is inaccurate.

You walk into the laboratory and you see the new tech Judy working at the bench with no gloves. Last week you spoke to Judy about the same issue, and she told you she would wear them from now on. In your frustration you believe Judy to be obdurate and someone who willfully violates lab safety practices. Because these things are in your mind, the conversation you are about to have with Judy will not go well.

Consider the following options:

  • Judy ran out of gloves and doesn’t know where to get more.
  • Judy went to get more gloves in the store room, but there is a combination lock on the door and she doesn’t know what it is.
  • Judy has developed a skin reaction to the gloves and is embarrassed to bring it up.
  • Judy just received a phone call that her mother is very ill and she is quite upset.
  • Judy saw the supervisor working without gloves and assumed you spoke to her last week because it’s your job to look out for safety.

These are just some of the possible influences on Judy’s decision not to wear gloves. To have good conversations about safety, your job is to determine the real issue without telling yourself stories first. Maybe everyone in the lab says “irregardless.” Maybe no one ever told Judy the correct word to use.

If you want to make a difference in your lab safety culture, think about the sources of influence on staff behavior. Ask about the reasons for the behavior, and work patiently to educate people about the consequences of unsafe actions. Use these tactics to reduce the amount of “flustration” you may feel when working to promote safety every day.

 

Scungio 1

-Dan Scungio, MT(ASCP), SLS, CQA (ASQ) has over 25 years experience as a certified medical technologist. Today he is the Laboratory Safety Officer for Sentara Healthcare, a system of seven hospitals and over 20 laboratories and draw sites in the Tidewater area of Virginia. He is also known as Dan the Lab Safety Man, a lab safety consultant, educator, and trainer.

CLSI Publishes a New Document on Management of Critical- and Significant-Risk Results

From the press release:

“The Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) has published a new document titled Management of Critical- and Significant-Risk Results (GP47-Ed1). This guideline provides current best practice recommendations for developing and implementing a policy and procedures for the identification, reporting, and management of critical- and significant-risk laboratory results. Emphasis is placed on management responsibilities such as development of the policy, the process, procedures, job descriptions, and monitoring systems that ensure effective reporting and compliance with regulatory requirements.

This new document refers to results as critical risk and significant risk, depending on the degree of risk to the patient. The recommendations in the standard are intended to be consistent with best practices for patient safety, and compliant with current, pertinent regulatory and accreditation requirements. GP47 includes an executive summary and appendixes with sample policies, reporting methods, escalation procedures, and monitoring tools.

This document is intended for clinical and laboratory directors, managers, and personnel who develop and implement laboratory policies and processes. The standard is also intended for health care administrators who oversee compliance with regulatory requirements, accreditation, and clinical practice standards related to patient safety. The recommendations cover every laboratory discipline and pertain to clinical laboratories of every size, scope, and complexity.”

 

Lab Safety: A Deadly Ride?

Mumbai is one of the financial capitals in India, and millions of commuters ride its railway network to and from work every day. However, over the past several years, the available public transportation has not increased in proportion to the city’s rise in population. This has resulted in overcrowded trains and a staggering death toll from accidents and falls. In 2005, a total of 494 passengers lost their lives after falling from running trains. This figure went up subsequently in the coming years and climbed to 901 by 2013. In 2015 nine people a day, on average, lose their lives while on the move.

Knowing these facts, how inclined would you or your lab staff be to take a train ride in Mumbai? Not very. Yet, there are people in that city who willingly get on board every day. These conditions of danger are normal for them. This is their culture. They have become immersed in it, and it has become difficult for them to step back and look at the big picture–even for their own safety. They have to get to work.

In the past, laboratory professionals worked in departments where mouth-pipetting was normal, where eating, drinking and smoking was common, and where working without PPE was accepted. Today we look at old lab pictures of these behaviors and react (I hope) with surprise. But what applies to the commuters in Mumbai might also apply to labs of the past as well—those technologists were immersed in their culture.

Since those times, many lab safety regulations have been put in place, but that hasn’t fixed the safety culture everywhere. There may be, of course, other reasons for unsafe conduct in the laboratory. There may be behaviors that have been held onto after years of practice, there may be a lack of safety education, or safety may simply not be a priority for lab leadership. All of these factors are a part of the lab safety culture. Do you know the culture on your lab?

Assessing the culture in your laboratory is important. If you are in leadership, you should not assume that your singular view of the culture is accurate. There are several ways to evaluate the culture; make a visual assessment, review injury and exposure incidents, or have staff take a written culture assessment.

Provide adequate safety education for your staff. Are they aware that there might be a better, safer way? Do they know where the PPE and engineering controls are? Have they been trained in their use? Is there any safety leadership holding staff accountable so that there are not too many people on the train?

Laboratory professionals have to get to work, but unlike the workers of Mumbai, it’s not necessarily the trip to work that’s an issue; it’s the work places which are not inherently safe. It takes knowledge, education, training and focus to keep people safe in the laboratory. Put safety in its proper perspective: we are not dealing with falling from a train, but we do encounter injuries, exposures, and lab-acquired infections, some of which can be just as deadly as a fall. Know your safety culture, and learn what it will take to make the needed changes so that no one in your lab becomes a statistic.

 

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-Dan Scungio, MT(ASCP), SLS, CQA (ASQ) has over 25 years experience as a certified medical technologist. Today he is the Laboratory Safety Officer for Sentara Healthcare, a system of seven hospitals and over 20 laboratories and draw sites in the Tidewater area of Virginia. He is also known as Dan the Lab Safety Man, a lab safety consultant, educator, and trainer.

One Part Interpreter

I’m thoroughly convinced that in order to change laboratory information systems (LIS) and get the new LIS to work correctly you need a mixture of one part laboratory professional, one part information technology (IT) specialist, and one part interpreter. Add together and then vortex vigorously.

The laboratory professional is a given. It is absolutely necessary to have a person or people who understand the lab tests inside and out, from linear range to reference intervals to instrument capabilities to antibiotic susceptibilities to type and cross-match. There must be people with an understanding of how the tests work and what type of information is needed in order to ensure that when a test result appears in the electronic medical record for the doctor to see, it is an accurate result that makes sense and is interpretable.

The IT specialist is also a given. This person or people must completely understand not only how to program the system, but what type of programming is possible – what the computer system is capable of doing – or not doing. Being currently immersed in changing LIS systems at my institution, I have come to appreciate more and more how these two individual types must be able to communicate with each other and work together to design and implement an LIS that is functional for everyone.

Which brings us to the “interpreter”. Sometimes IT and lab people simply don’t speak the same language. I know I sometimes feel as though the IT people have begun speaking in tongues. I’m occasionally amused by the totally blank looks on the faces around me, and no doubt on my own. Thus what a project like this requires is a facile communicator with enough knowledge of both the lab and the programming to successfully interpret between the experts. I’m calling this person an “interpreter”, but calling him/her a communicator would be just as accurate.

In my institution the interpreter role is most frequently filled by laboratory technologists who have gone over to the Dark Side, otherwise known as Information Technology. Much as I hate to lose them as medical laboratory scientists, they are pretty nearly worth their weight in gold as interpreters when changing LIS systems. To continue the analogy, without their input in the mix, the vigorous vortexing necessary often results in an emulsion, not a smooth mixture. The finished product may not function as desired simply because the programmer did not understand what was needed, or the laboratory professional did not understand the inherent capabilities of the LIS.

With any luck, we have enough interpreters in our mix to end up with a functional LIS we can all live with. I know the current meetings are going as smoothly as they are due to these people’s work.

 

 

-Patti Jones PhD, DABCC, FACB, is the Clinical Director of the Chemistry and Metabolic Disease Laboratories at Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, TX and a Professor of Pathology at University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas.

 

Are Feasibility Limits Feasible?

In the laboratory we’re constantly seeking ways to check that the test results that we put out are accurate. Our primary reason for doing this is that we want to make sure the patient is treated appropriately based on the results of the tests we run. Also, it’s nice not to release values that appear to be nonsense. A tool that is sometimes used to help us check results is something called feasibility limits.

Lab computer systems often allow you to enter feasibility limits for your test results or for your test parameters. These are values outside of which you would not expect to find an analyte concentration in a living person. For example, you might expect a serum creatinine of 200 mg/dL (17,680 µmol/L) in a zombie, but you wouldn’t expect to find one in a living human being. Setting feasibility limits helps you catch things that make no sense before the physician calls you on them, for instance if you have a decimal malfunction and mistakenly try to report a plasma calcium value of 90 mg/dL (22.5 mmol/L) instead of 9 mg/dL (2.25 mmol/L). The trick to feasibility limits is deciding on the highest or lowest value you might expect to see in a living human being. In the case of calcium, upper feasibility limits of 20 mg/dL (5 mmol/L) may give you wiggle room without letting you report nonsense. However, feasibility limits have their drawbacks also. One of those drawbacks is that I’ve found that with human beings, nearly anything is feasible, especially in the pediatric realm. I finally removed the feasibility limits from the LIS in my institution, after a couple of different episodes led me to that conclusion.

One was a body temperature on a blood gas analysis. Under normal circumstances one would not expect to encounter a body temperature much below 90° F (32.2 °C) ever. But of course hospitals are not known for their populations being “under normal circumstances”. The body temperature of the patient in question was 70° F (21°C) on a patient who had been cooled down for surgery. The blood gas instrument accepted the temperature, but the lab computer system would not because of the feasibility limits set in the computer. The patient’s blood gas results could not be released in the computer until we took the temperature feasibility limits out.

Another example was with sodium. It would seem reasonable to have an upper feasibility limit of 180 mmol/L for sodium. Yet we had a patient whose sodium was 199 mmol/L when he arrived in the ED. Reasonably expecting some sort of contamination issue, we requested another sample, which had a sodium of 204 mmol/L, followed by 200 mmol/L in the next sample. These were real sodium results and over the course of several days’ time the physicians managed to get the patient’s electrolytes normalized. Again, feasibility limits interfered with result reporting and had to be removed from the computer.

These episodes caused us to remove most of our feasibility limits from the computer. They also helped me to remember and important point: Tools are fine, but you must understand their uses and their limitations in order to use them appropriately. Feasibility limits can be useful as long as you keep in mind that with humans, you often see the unfeasible.

 

-Patti Jones PhD, DABCC, FACB, is the Clinical Director of the Chemistry and Metabolic Disease Laboratories at Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, TX and a Professor of Pathology at University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas.

AMP Submitts Written Testimony about LDTs

From the press release:

“The Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP), the premier global, professional society serving molecular diagnostics professionals, yesterday submitted written testimony to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health for their hearing on “Examining the Regulation of Diagnostic Tests and Laboratory Operations.” AMP urged the Committee to use AMP’s proposal to modernize the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) as the basis for legislation that would preserve innovative patient care by building upon the current CMS-based system for oversight of laboratory developed procedures (LDPs).

‘Molecular pathologists are highly trained professionals and our professional judgment is used throughout the design, validation, performance, ongoing monitoring, and interpretation of test results. It is our mission to ensure that patients have access to innovative, accurate, reliable, and medically useful laboratory testing procedures,’ said Roger D. Klein, MD, JD, AMP Professional Relations Chair. ‘The AMP CLIA Modernization proposal preserves patient access to essential laboratory services that would no longer be offered if a costly FDA-based regulatory system were imposed upon academic medical centers, cancer centers, hospitals and small independent laboratories,’ he added.

To read the press release in full, visit www.amp.org.

CLSI Publishes a Revised Microbiology Document

From the press release:

“The Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) has published a revised document titled Methods for Antimicrobial Dilution and Disk Susceptibility Testing of Infrequently Isolated or Fastidious Bacteria (M45-Ed3).This guideline informs clinical, public health, and research laboratories on susceptibility testing of infrequently isolated or fastidious bacteria that are not included in CLSI documents M02, M07, or M100. Antimicrobial agent selection, test interpretation, and quality control are discussed.
“Susceptibility testing is particularly necessary in situations in which the etiological agent belongs to a bacterial species for which resistance to commonly used antimicrobial agents has been documented, or could arise. The intent of this document revision is to assist labs in determining an approach for testing that is relevant to their individual practice settings.”

To order the document go to shop.clsi.org/m45.

Radiation in the Lab

Radioactivity is no longer common in most clinical laboratories. At one point in my career, radioimmunoassays were commonly found in laboratories, and most labs had institutional radiation safety plans and carefully followed the CAP checklist for handling and dealing with radioactivity. With the advent of enzyme-linked immunoassays, sensitive nephelometers, various fluorescent and chemiluminescent technologies, and then mass spectrometry, radiation was quickly replaced in most clinical labs. The general prevailing thought was: Why deal with radiation if you don’t have to? Now days, radioimmunoassays are essentially only found in reference labs and utilized for esoteric analytes or those which cannot be measured any other way.

Despite that being true, it’s important for a lab to know what to do if radioactive materials should appear in the lab. How likely is that to happen? Perhaps more likely than you may think. Last week a sample shipped to us from an outside institution set off the radioactivity monitor on our hospital loading dock. The package was on a delivery cart with other packages so per protocol, the whole cart went to nuclear medicine where it was determined that the radioactive package was for the lab and it was brought to us. The radioactive sample turned out to be a urine sample for VMA/HVA analysis from a patient on a new cancer treatment protocol. The urine was indeed radioactive.

The shipping institution was contacted and the packaging personnel had no idea either that the sample was radioactive, although they were aware a new protocol was going into place. Working with our nuclear medicine department and the institutional radiation safety group, we have now once again put appropriate processes in place to handle and deal with radioactivity. And we’ve dusted off our old CAP checklist regulations as well.

This episode actually turned out to be a benefit to us, as we discovered that our own nuclear medicine department will be starting this new protocol soon, and had not thought ahead to possible radioactive samples sent to the lab. We are now working closely with them to ensure proper procedures and safeguards, and have a plan of action clearly in place. We also continue to work with the institution that sends us samples. The very next sample from them was properly labeled as potentially radioactive.

-Patti Jones PhD, DABCC, FACB, is the Clinical Director of the Chemistry and Metabolic Disease Laboratories at Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, TX and a Professor of Pathology at University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas.

Calling New Laboratory Directors and Managers

If you’re a laboratory director or manager who’s recently stepped into that role, the editors of Lab Medicine want to hear from you. As a new leader, you’re sure to have questions, challenges, and insecurities. Leave your questions in the comments, and it could be discussed in a future podcast.